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        Generics and Topicality 
                            Yuya Ohkawa 
1 Introduction 
 This article clarifies the validity of exploration into English 
generic sentences on the basis of Fauconnier's (1997) mental 
space theory. Generic sentences are generally defined as "sen-
tences with kind-reading, which mention general traits in 
terms of a particular thing." (1) shows that a bare plural noun 
phrase is most commonly exploited as a subject but other 
types of noun phrases can be allowed: 
 (1) a. Birds fly. (Cohen 1999: 2) 
   b.  Dogs are mammals. (ibid.) 
     c. The potato was first cultivated in South America. 
                              (Krifka et al. 1995:2)
     d. A potato contains vitamin C, amino acids, protein and
   thiamine. (ibid.: 3) 
     e. John smokes a cigar after dinner. (ibid.)
The crucial point to make in this article is that the subject of 
a generic sentence upholds topicality. In view of this, we shall 
discuss how generic sentences are to be semantically described 
by building particular mental spaces rather than conforming to 
the conventions assumed in formal semantics. We are con-
cerned only with English copular generic sentences with a plu-
ral indefinite noun phrase as a subject (NPs are...), as in  (lb).
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2 Formal Semantic Approach to Generics 
2. 1 G Operator 
 In general, the logical form of a generic sentence like (2) is 
not properly depicted either with a universal or with an exis-
tential quantifier. (3a) implies that every entity that belongs 
to whales should be intelligent, which does not fit the 
genericity (2) intends. Likewise, neither is (3b) considered ap-
propriate because it is supposed to be true with only one intel-
ligent individual that belongs to the category of whales. 
Taking this into consideration, Carlson (1977) et al. propose 
the G operator, which raises stage-level predicates (e. g. events) 
to individual-level (e. g. habits) as in (4): 
 (2) Whales are intelligent. 
 (3) a.  V  x [whales(x) intelligent(x)] 
    b.  i  x [whales(x) & intelligent(x)] 
 (4) G (intelligent) (whales) 
Unfortunately, it is not clear what condition makes predicates 
rise to individual-level. If the total number of individuals is to 
be involved in the truth condition of generic sentences, can 
this operation present a necessary and sufficient number for 
their license? 
2. 2 The Total Number of Cases 
 According to Cohen (1999), the truth condition of generic 
sentences is concerned with whether more than half of the 
total number of cases can be approved in some particular con-
text. This condition seems to apply in (5). (6), however, evi-
dently illustrates that generic sentences show themselves when 
more than half of the total number of instances fails to be 
verified: 
 (5) a. Birds fly.  ( =  1  a)
         Yuya Ohkawa 3 
   b. Dogs are mammals.  (  =  lb) 
 (6) a. The platypus lays eggs. (Cohen 1999: 2) 
     b. Bulgarians are good weightlifters. (ibid.) 
The entire number of platypuses with the ability to lay eggs 
is believed to be quite small. Equally, there seem to be only a 
few good Bulgarian weightlifters compared to the whole popu-
lation of Bulgarians. Accordingly, the total number of cases 
has nothing to do with the truth condition of generic sen-
tences. 
3 Background: Mental Space Theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) 
 As the previous section revealed, generic sentences have 
been mainly analyzed in the framework of formal semantics. 
Mental space theory, advocated by Fauconnier (1994, 1997), is 
designed to elucidate, from the viewpoint of our cognition, a 
number of problems that formalists should figure out but 
shares the course or target of analysis with formal semantics. 
This article bears out this standpoint, sheds light on the ad-
vantages of mental space theory, which necessitates no inter-
vention of quantifiers and effectively identifies elements 
included in different spaces by ID Principle (see Fauconnier 
1994: 3 in detail), and seeks to examine English generic sen-
tences relying on matching operation. 
 We have to clarify the concept of matching, which is a cog-
nitive operation employed in such sentences as when-clauses 
and if-clauses and causes a similar deduction to Modus Pones. 
Suppose that the following conditional sentence is introduced 
at some stage in the discourse construction, relative to a space 
M in focus: 
 (7) If A, then B. 
A foundation space F subordinate to the space M is
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constructed by applying the instruction of language expression 
A. An expansion space E subordinate to the foundation space 
F is constructed by applying the instruction of B to a copy of 
the foundation space F. Moreover, if the structure of the foun-
dation space F is a substructure of the space M, namely, if the 
foundation space F matches the space M, the structure of the 
expansion space E will be projected onto the space M by 
means of the matching condition in (8), yielding the correct 
inference: 
 (8) Matching Condition 
      Spaces of domain type D, which are matched by the 
      Foundation, can be expanded by projection of the
     Expansion. (Fauconnier 1997: 140) 
 Let us consider the subsequent examples to see how this op-
eration works: 
 (9) a. If Olga is in the shower, Paul is in the kitchen. 
                                     (ibid.: 132)
     b. It's hot. There's noise in the street. Paul is unhappy. 
     Olga is taking a shower. (ibid.) 
(9a) occurs at some stage of the discourse, relative to a space 
M, simultaneously building both a foundation space F and an 
expansion space E. The space M at that point has some struc-
ture [a, b,  ...]  {E}, with a and b the elements corresponding to 
"Paul" and "Olga." Then, provided that (9b) elaborates the 
space M, the foundation space F can be a substructure of the 
space M, in other words, the foundation space F matches the 
space M, because  b1 is  a counterpart of b. It follows by (8) that 
the structure of the expansion space E can be projected onto 
the space M. Finally, we have the proper inference relative to 
M that Paul is in the kitchen, as (10) demonstrates.
         Yuya Ohkawa 5 
  (10) 
         a ---------                             --- -- Projection 
  HOT b 
  NOISE E 
         SHOWER b 
               SHOWER I), a2 
  KITCHEN b2 
                                           SHOWERb2
                                             KITCHENa2
 4 Analysis 
 4.  1 Topicality and the Function of Generic Sentences 
   "Topic
," which has been widely touched on in functionalism, 
 refers to "something" when we mention something in an ongo-
 ing discourse and often conveys given information. One of the 
 functions of generics (NPs  are  ...) is  obviously "to mention 
 something," and "something" serves as the subject of a generic 
 sentence. Consider (2) again: 
  (11) Whales are intelligent.  ( = 2) 
 Given that the function involved is "to mention x," x refers to 
 whales, with its attribute described as intelligent. Thus, the 
 subject of a generic sentence maintains topicality. 
 4. 2 The Subject of a Generic Sentence 
   First, let us look at an example in which the subject is pre-
 viously mentioned:
OT 
OISE 
HOWER 
I I HEN I
Projection
HOWER b, a2
b2
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 (12) As I entered the woods at the crossing of a dry creek, 
      I noticed that my horse was nervous. I knew that 
      horses are quick to discover animals or men by scent, 
       and I became nervous, too. 
        (HTI; henceforth, the underline and boldface are my 
       own.) 
 ([M]y) horse in (12) is noticeably the horse that has emerged 
in the speaker's real world; on the other hand, horses refers to 
general horses widely accepted in the actual world. From this 
speculation, we are in a better position to say that the referent 
in the speaker's real world does not completely correspond to 
that of the subject of a generic sentence. What matters here is 
that these two referents are relevant as regards topicality, 
which is enlightened by the use of phrases with similar mean-
ings, such as horse and horses. 
 How about the instance in which the subject is not previ-
ously mentioned? 
 (13) I don't want anything but food, lodging, clothes, and 
       now and then a railway fare. I haven't any tastes. I
      don't collect anything or play games. Books are nice to
      have, but after all there is Mudie's, or if it comes to
    that, the Free Library. (ibid.)
Books in (13) is not previously mentioned or the referent in 
the speaker's real world and transmits what is called new in-
formation. The discourse, however, usually proceeds in accor-
dance with the speaker's real world. This being the case, Books 
is not the referent in the speaker's real world but relevant to 
the speaker's real world with regard to topicality.
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4. 3 Application of Matching Operation to English Generic Sentences 
 The present study focuses on the matching operation by 
which English generic sentences are to be semantically repre-
sented. Let us here assume the following: 
 (14) Let the space M in focus be the space of the speaker's 
       real world. 
 (15) While there are not any concrete space builders in the 
       form "NPs  are  ...  ," generic adverb phrases such as usu-
      ally and in generic show up non-phonetically, which 
      serves to build a foundation space F. 
 (16) The subject of a generic sentence (role) is introduced 
      into the foundation space F. 
 (17) The subject and its attribute are represented in the ex-
       pansion space E. 
Based on the assumptions above, we shall now look more 
closely at generic sentences in standard space building. As for 
(18), we regard (19) as the content of the speaker's real world 
and expect the role of "whale" not to remain in it.  The func-
tion of generic sentences in itself does allow (18) to be accept-
able as a generic sentence even if a speaker does not deem 
every whale to be intelligent: 
 (18) Whales are intelligent.  (  =2) 
 (19)  John  {whale,  intelligent} 
      Mary {whale,dumb} 
      Paul {whale, dumb} 
      Sue {whale, intelligent} 
      George {whale,dumb} 
First, by (16), the role (whale) is introduced in the foundation 
space F. Then, by the matching condition in (8), if the struc-
ture of the foundation space F is a substructure of the space
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M, that of the expansion space E can be projected onto the 
space M. However, as (20) indicates, we cannot find the role of 
"whale" in the space M, deducing that the foundation space F 
does not match the space M, which hinders the projection of 
the expansion space E onto the space M. Much still remains to 
be done on regular space building. 
 (20) 
                        ---- Projection 
                          A --. 
 John {whale, intelligent} '' ,`,  M
ary {whale, dumb} 
                                     E *-,  Paul{whale, dumb} 
 Sue{whale, intelligent} 
 George{whale, dumb} w: role (whale) 
                                        w':role(whale)
                                     INTELLIGENT(w')
 Then, we must provide new assumptions to depict generics 
properly and are reminded that "the subject of a generic sen-
tence maintains topicality," mentioned above: 
 (21) The topicality shared by the subject of a generic sen-
      tence builds a new space K, subordinate to the space M. 
 (22) The focus is shifted from the space M onto the space K. 
 (23) The space K contains roles of every noun phrase. 
Let us reconsider (18). By (16), the role (whale) is introduced 
in the foundation space F, and (21) leads to building a new 
space K. Then, by the matching condition in (8), if the
hn hale, telligent} 
M ry hale, b} 
Paul{whale, b} 
e{whale, telligent} 
orge{whale, b}
  ...
. Projection
: le hale)
': le hale) 
TEL IGENT ')
        Yuya Ohkawa 9 
structure of the foundation space F is a substructure of the 
space K, that of the expansion space E can be projected onto 
the space K in focus. (23) guarantees that the foundation 
space F matches the space K because of the roles of every 
noun phrase in the space K. As (24) shows  more succinctly, in 
the phase of the matching between the space K and the foun-
dation space F and the projection onto the space K, every 
whale in the real world should be intelligent. Be that as it 
may, in the space M (the space of the speaker's real world) 
every whale is not intelligent. This structural discrepancy be-
tween the space M and the space K, thus, causes the sentence 
concerned to be a generic sentence; in contrast, it should be a 
universal sentence (e. g. Every whale is intelligent) rather than 
a generic without this discrepancy. 
 (24)        K (Focus) W: role (whale) 
                                    INTELLIGENT 
 M •
                                 !rojection 
 John {whale, intelligent} 
 Mary {whale, dumb} 
 Paul {whale, dumb} 
 Sue {whale, intelligent} w: role (whale) 
 George {whale, dumbl 
                                          w': role (whale) 
                                      INTELLIGENT (w')
5 Summary 
 I have pointed out through this study that generic sentences 
are space-built in the same way conditional sentences are.
K (Focus) W le hale)
I I TELLIGENT I
  Projection
: role ( hale)
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Assuming the topicality of the subject of a generic sentence, I 
have made obvious that the topicality functions as a space 
builder of a  space. K, which contains roles of every noun 
phrase.  Only with the matching between the space K and the 
foundation space F and the projection onto the space K, the 
sentence concerned can be looked upon as a universal sen-
tence. However, the space M (the space of the speaker's real 
world) has no roles of noun phrases in it, so that the space M 
is totally non-identical to the space K as to the structure. This 
structural disparity results directly in different semantic de-
scriptions between generic sentences and universal sentences. 
                  Acknowledgements 
 In writing this article, I have incurred many debts. Let me thank my fellow 
students of English linguistics and English and American literature at Osaka 
University for constructive comments and encouragement. My thanks go to 
Paul A. Harvey for stylistic improvements. Remaining inadequacies, of course, 
belong to me. 
 Finally, for help in editing Osaka Literary Review  vol. 43, let me thank Saori 
Tanaka for generous assistance. 
                       References 
Carlson, G. N. (1977) References to Kinds in English. New York: Garland. 
 Carlson, G. N. (1995) "Truth Conditions of Generic Sentences: Two Contrasting 
   Views." In G. N. Carlson and F. J. Pelletier (eds.) The GenericBook: 224-237. 
   Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Cohen, A. (1999) Think Generic!: The Meaning and Use of Generic Sentences. 
   Stanford: CSLI. 
Epstein, R. (1996) "Viewpoint and the Definite Article." In A. E. Goldberg (ed.) 
   Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language: 99-112. Stanford: CSLI.
Fauconnier, G.(1994) Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction n Natural 
   Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fauconnier, G.(1997)  Mappings inThought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge 
   University Press.
         Yuya Ohkawa 11 
Fukuchi, H. (1997) Danwa no Kozo [Structure of Discourse]. Tokyo: Taishukan 
   Shoten. 
Halliday, M. A. K. (1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: 
   Edward Arnold. 
Hamamoto, H., H. Tominaga and D. Umehara (1999) "Aru Imiron-teki na Gogo: 
   Soshobun o Meguru Taiwa [A Semantic Afternoon: A Dialogue on Generic 
   Sentences]." Osaka Literary Review 38: 175-188. 
Kratzer, A. (1995) "Stage-Level and Individual-Level Predicates." In G. N.  Carlson 
   and F. J. Pelletier (eds.) The Generic Book: 125-175. Chicago: The University 
   of Chicago Press. 
Krifka, M. et al. (1995) "Genericity: An Introduction." In G. N. Carlson and F. J. 
   Pelletier (eds.) The Generic Book: 1-124. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
    Press. 
Nishiyama, Y. (2003) Nihongo-meishiku no Imiron to Goyoron: Shiji-meishiku to 
   Hi-shiji-meishiku [Semantics and  Pragmatics of Japanese Noun Phrases: 
   Referential Noun Phrases and Non-referential Noun Phrases]. Tokyo: Hitsuji 
   Shobo. 
Sakahara, S. (ed.) (2000) Ninchi-gengogaku no Hatten [Advances in Cognitive 
   Language]. Tokyo: Hitsuji Shobo. 
                               Corpus
HTI Modern English Collection (http://www. hti. umichi. edu) [HTI]
